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 Why do firms go public through debt instead of equity?  
Abstract 
We analyze a sample of private firms that go public through an initial public debt offering (IPDO) as 
an alternative to going public through equity (IPO). Firms that choose the IPDO route are larger, more 
likely to be backed by a financial sponsor such as a venture capital or private equity firm, and less 
likely to face information asymmetry than traditional IPO firms. Only a quarter of these firms 
eventually conduct an IPO, but those who do face lower underpricing than their contemporaneous 
private peers who do not have public debt at the time of going public. 
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1. Introduction 
Extant literature typically describes the going public process as involving private firms 
choosing to go public through an equity issuance - an initial public offering (IPO), a process that 
allows the owners to exit.1 The theoretical and empirical literature has neglected the possibility of 
firms choosing to go public through a debt issuance – an initial public debt offering (IPDO).2  Yet, 
as an available option, it could also affect the IPO choice. Selection biases in the type of firms 
choosing the equity market IPO could influence the results in the IPO market literature. 
In this paper, we document the relative importance of the IPDO process and examine 
characteristics of firms that choose to go public through debt rather than equity. Our sample 
consists of 635 hand-collected IPDOs from 1987 to 2016. We compare these firms to 
contemporaneous IPO firms to analyze why these firms choose to go public through the debt 
market.  
Over our sample period, 18% of going public firms chose to access public markets through 
public debt, while 82% chose to access the equity market. Controlling for industry and year, the 
total amount raised is around 45% of that raised through IPO issues. Around a quarter of our IPDO 
firms eventually issued equity. The average time lag between the IPDO and the subsequent IPO is 
over two years, similar to that in Welch (1989) for seasoned offerings following the IPO. 
Theory suggests that the choice of venue depends on three factors: (1) the costs of information 
production, (2), the value of a liquid currency, and (3) the value of private benefits of control. First, 
going public, whether through debt or equity, involves disclosing the same level of information 
                                                 
1 There are only a handful of papers analyzing the going public decision. They include Lerner (1994) who studies the 
timing of IPOs in a sample of privately held biotechnology firms, Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998), Fischer (2000) 
and Aslan and Kumar (2011) who study the decision to go public in Italy, Germany, and the U.K. respectively, Bancel 
and Mittoo (2009) who survey European Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) on the determinants of their going public 
decisions, and Helwege and Packer (2009) and Chemmanur, He, and Nandy (2010) who study firms’ decisions to go 
public in the U.S. 
2 Papers that examine the first issue of bonds by public and private firms largely focus on explaining the underpricing 
once the firm has already made the decision to choose a particular market. Examples include Datta, Iskandar-Datta, 
and Patel (2000) who show that in contrast to seasoned debt offering announcements, the initial public debt offering 
by a publicly listed firm has a negative impact on shareholder value, Berkovitch, Gesser, and Sarig (2005) who do 
not examine the going public decision itself but compare the equilibrium characteristics of private firms with public 
debt to public firms and document that firms with public equity in place but no public debt tend to have a higher 
R&D intensity, Cai, Helwege, and Warga (2007) who examine underpricing outcomes in the corporate bond market, 
and Saunders and Steffen (2011) and Kovner and Wei (2011) who document that private firms are substantially 
disadvantaged in the debt market compared to public firms.  
 - 2 - 
through similar financial statements. 3  Ball, Robin, and Sadka (2008) argue that, like equity 
markets, debt markets utilize both financial-statement and other information in pricing decisions, 
at issuance and in the secondary market. However, debt differs from equity in that many of the 
post-issuance contractual rights of lenders are written in terms of financial statement variables 
alone. Reported financial statements can affect various covenanted financial ratios (balance sheet 
leverage and earnings-based interest coverage ratios), and dividend and stock repurchase 
restrictions. Other information that is not reflected in the financial statements does not affect those 
rights. In contrast, shareholders are comparatively less interested as to whether gain and loss 
information is reflected in the financial statements or received via non-financial disclosure, so long 
as they receive it. Hence firms that are more easily able to disclose their important performance 
data through financial statements have a relative advantage in the debt market.  Second, an equity 
issue exposes them to a risk of a loss of private benefits of control. Third, going public through 
equity also allows managers to create a liquid currency to carry out other transactions. That is not 
the case with debt. Our hypotheses and variables are summarized in Table 1.  
To obtain our IPDO sample, we start by examining firms that issue public securities for the 
first time. Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that mandates that firms that issue 
public securities of any type are required to file an annual report during the fiscal year within which 
the public security registration statement became effective, as long as at the beginning of that year, 
they had more than 300 security holders on record, and regardless of whether they have publicly 
traded equity or not.4 We hand-collect financial statement data on private firms that issue public 
debt without having public equity in place and compare this unique hand-collected IPDO sample 
to traditional IPOs with no public debt outstanding. We perform two sets of comparisons: (1) 
matching firms on industry and year to control for variations in the level of market and industry 
sentiment that have been shown to influence the level of security issuance (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002), and (2) matching firms on industry, year, and firm assets to control for size, although the 
sample size shrinks in the latter case.  
IPDO firms are not concentrated in any particular industry. Private firms issue public debt in 
43 industries (based on the Fama-French 48 industry classification). However, controlling for 
                                                 
3 The direct costs of going public are similar for both markets. Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant (2009) estimate 
initial audit fees on the order of about $1 million for the average firm listed on Audit Analytics from 2000-2007. 
Private firms that issue public financials are even rarer.  
4 See pp. 172-173 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sea34.pdf 
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industry, year, and size, there are significant differences between IPDO and IPO firms. IPDO firms 
typically exhibit superior operating performance, spend less on research and development, have 
higher ratios of operating cash flows to capital expenditure, and have more private debt than IPO 
firms. In other words, IPDO firms appear to be more established firms whose assets are relatively 
more amenable to financial statement analysis. They are also more likely to be backed by a 
financial sponsor such as a venture capital or private equity firm, suggesting that ownership 
structure also matters. However, an industry liquidity index that measures the level of corporate 
transaction activity, is largely unrelated to the probability of an IPDO, suggesting that creation of 
a liquid currency is not a factor in the choice of venue. 
There are also significant differences between IPDO firms and public firms that issue debt for 
the first time (PFDO) in the same industry and year. IPDO firms are older, are more likely to be 
sponsor-backed, have better operating performance, similar growth opportunities, and lower 
liquidity than PFDO firms. They also face a significantly higher cost of debt (offer yield), more 
restrictive covenants, and lower credit ratings than the PFDO firms. 
16% of the IPDO sample subsequently issue equity through an IPO, without issuing any 
additional public debt prior to the IPO. Another 11% access the public debt market at least once 
more before issuing public equity. By the end of our sample period in 2016, while a significant 
number of firms end up being acquired (23%), only a relatively tiny proportion of firms (1%) go 
bankrupt or are liquidated, or go private again (2%). 
Welch (1989) argues that underpricing at the IPO results in a higher price at a seasoned 
offering. If the same mechanism holds for debt offerings, IPDO firms may earn better terms at a 
subsequent public debt or equity offering. For the firms that issue public debt again following the 
IPDO, the subsequent offering is larger and indeed has a lower offer yield. This result continues 
to hold in a multivariate framework, where after controlling for year fixed effects, leverage, the 
terms of the debt, the offer yield is lower for the subsequent issue of public debt by the IPDO firms 
relative to their first issue of public debt. After adding controls for firm and covenant 
characteristics, however, the difference in offer yield is no longer significant. After a firm has filed 
formal financial statements while going public, there appear to be fewer benefits for subsequent 
issues. 
27% of our IPDO sample subsequently choose to raise public equity. For these firms, the initial 
higher cost of debt at the IPDO does appear to be offset by lower underpricing at the time of the 
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eventual IPO. The median IPO underpricing (proxied by the first day return) for our sample of 
IPDO firms that chose to eventually issue public equity is less than a third that of matching IPO 
firms issuing public equity with no prior public debt in place; the amount raised through the 
offering is double; and the fees charged by the equity underwriters are lower. Controlling for firm 
size, age, operating performance, industry, and time, an IPDO indicator variable is significantly 
negatively related to the level of underpricing in the issue. 
In sum, our paper shows that ownership structure and the relative cost of information 
production are significant factors dictating the choice of venue in going public. Future IPO 
research should take into account that firms do not just face a choice between going public and 
staying private, but also an intermediate choice of issuing public debt but staying private. 
2. Data Sources  
We obtain issuance data from Thomson-Reuters SDC Platinum (for both public debt and 
equity) and Mergent FISD (for public debt). Credit ratings that are not available in SDC and FISD 
are supplemented by data from S&P Ratings Xpress and Datastream. Fundamental firm data is 
obtained from Compustat, and price/return data are obtained from CRSP, Compustat North 
America, and Compustat Global security pricing files. Our sample covers a total of 635 IPDO 
issuers from 1987-2016. We start in 1987 because bond data is sparse before 1987.5 The Appendix 
(in the main text) describes our matching procedure briefly and the online Appendix goes into 
more detail.  
For the purposes of comparison, we form two control samples: (1) firms that issue public equity 
via an IPO without having any public debt outstanding (2,963 equity IPOs) and (2) publicly listed 
firms that tap the public debt market for the first time (PFDO firms) (897 issuers) respectively. 
Both sets of controls are matched on the sample firm’s industry (using the Fama-French 48 
industry classification) and year.6 We also match on industry, year, and size, though this sample 
size is smaller. Finally, to investigate if IPDO firms have better deal terms during their first equity 
issuance (IPO) that follows the initial public debt offering, we use the SDC equity issues database 
                                                 
5 Less than 2.5% (3%) of all FISD (SDC) bond issues are recorded with an issue year prior to 1987. 
6  In untabulated robustness tests, we compare the IPDO firms with publicly listed firms that have public debt 
outstanding and issue additional public debt subsequently in the same industry and year (909 issuers). Our results are 
qualitatively similar to those documented for PFDO firms and hence we discuss only the PFDO comparison in the 
text. 
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to identify 171 IPDO firms that eventually went public by issuing public equity in our analysis 
period between 1987 and 2016.  
3. Characteristics of IPDO firms 
3.1 Are IPDO firms significant in terms of raising capital? 
Table 2 shows the time series issuance patterns of our sample of unlisted IPDO firms and 
compares them to two industry-year and industry-year-size matched IPO control samples, plus one 
publicly-listed firm debt-issue control sample, also matched on industry and year. In the industry-
year-size matched sample, we constrain the matched industry-year IPO firms to have total assets 
at least as large as the IPDO firm. The final PFDO control sample consists of listed firms that issue 
public debt for the first time.  
Over the 1987-2016 period, 635 private firms choose to tap the public debt market for the first 
time (there are no IPDO firms in 2008 and 2009), a number similar to those by PFDO firms (897). 
Not surprisingly, the number of firms issuing public debt is highly correlated over time across the 
IPDO and PFDO control samples, with a coefficient of correlation of 0.89. The IPDO sample is a 
non-trivial proportion (around 20%) of all IPO firms that issue equity in the same industry and 
year, with 2,963 (850) industry-year matched (industry-year-sized) matched IPO firms 
respectively. Figure 1 illustrates these patterns graphically. The correlations between the IPDO 
sample and the two IPO samples are positive and significant at 0.71 and 0.47 respectively, 
suggesting that while there is a significant time-series component to when firms tap the capital 
markets, the choices of venue are based on cross-sectional differences in the firms.  
Next, we test the alternative hypothesis that firms self-select into the IPDO and IPO markets 
based on time-series factors in financing, not on cross-sectional characteristics. For example, the 
IPO market was relatively cold between 2001-2003. If selection is based on time-series factors 
that affect the cost of financing, firms that chose an IPDO would be more likely to continue with 
an equity offering immediately after equity market activity increased after 2004. However, tracing 
the history of these firms (not reported in the tables) shows no significant variations in changes in 
equity issuance activity following either cold or hot markets. Firms do not appear to self-select 
into public markets based on the time-series of returns. They also do not appear to choose IPDOs 
because there are no peer IPOs.  
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IPDO firms also raise significantly more capital each time they tap the capital markets through 
debt financing than their industry-year matched equity IPO counterparts. While the aggregate 
amount of debt issued for the IPDO sample is less than half the value of equity raised via an IPO 
– $87 billion and $194 billion, respectively – the average IPDO firm raises $264 million of capital 
versus $49 million for the average industry-year matched IPO. The numbers for the industry-year-
sized matched IPO sample is roughly comparable to the IPDO sample. 
 
3.2. Comparing IPDO and IPO firms 
We report univariate comparisons between the IPDO and the two IPO samples in Table 3. The 
ownership structure differs significantly between the IPDO and the IPO samples with a sponsor 
involvement in 70% and 48% (55%) of the IPDO and industry-year matched (industry-size-year 
matched) IPO firms respectively. Turning to firm characteristics, IPDO firms are significantly 
older and larger than their IPO counterparts. IPDO firms have a median age of 10 years at issuance 
versus 5 years for both the industry-year matched and industry-year-size matched IPO samples, 
each. The median IPDO firm also has total assets of $382 million which is significantly larger than 
the $91 million for the median industry-year matched IPO firm and the $163 million for the 
industry-year-size matched firm. Finally, IPDO firms have significantly higher ratios of industry-
adjusted operating cash flow to capital expenditure to their size-matched IPO counterparts, 
suggesting that they do not need to raise significant amounts of external capital to finance their 
investments. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that debt markets might be more 
willing to supply credit to older, more established firms with lower financial distress costs – firms 
where financial statement information is relatively important in establishing value.  
This hypothesis also appears to explain our results on operating performance. Operating 
performance, as proxied by industry-median adjusted operating ROA, is significantly higher for 
the IPDO firms, with values of 0.01 relative to −0.09 (−0.04) for the industry-year (industry-year-
size) matched IPO firms. Proxies for growth opportunities, as measured by the ratios of R&D to 
assets, are significantly lower for the IPDO firms than for their IPO controls. Finally, industry-
adjusted leverage metrics are significantly higher for the IPDO sample than for the industry-year 
matched IPO firms, Overall, these results are consistent with the view that those firms with lower 
investment needs, greater transparency about the underlying asset base, and larger size, are more 
likely to access public debt markets.  
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Liquidity metrics, proxied by the current, quick, and cash ratios, are the one dimension where 
the IPDO firms display a significant worse picture than IPO firms. Current, quick, and cash ratios 
are all significantly lower than their equity first counterparts. This is not entirely surprising. To the 
extent that IPO firms are likely to exhibit greater earnings variability emanating from higher 
embedded growth options, one would expect these firms to maintain higher liquidity levels to 
manage tail risk on the balance sheet.  
In Table 4, we examine the capital raising choice in a logit regression framework. Specifically, 
the dependent variable takes the value 1 if it corresponds to an observation in our primary IPDO 
sample and 0 for the industry-year matched (models 1-5) and industry-year-size matched (model 
6) IPO samples. While we do not specifically control for macro-economic characteristics that 
affect the decision to issue since our sample firms are matched to the control sample by industry 
and year of issuance (and size), we still include year fixed effects to alleviate the concern that this 
match may not fully control for all the differences. We report coefficients for a restricted subset of 
the variables in Panel A to avoid multicollinearity issues. However, we note our results are robust 
to using the alternative variables.  
Most of our variable choices are driven by the findings of Chemmanur, He, and Nandy (2010) 
who find that size, age, and private funding (sponsor-backing in our sample) are important 
determinants of the decision of the firm to go public using equity. Beyond the measures in Table 
3, we include the level of industry misvaluation to proxy for the existence of windows of 
opportunity (market timing behavior) (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). We also control for a number of 
market-specific underpricing factors and costs. Equity underpricing is the median first day return 
of all equity IPOs in the respective Fama-French industry in a given month, while debt 
underpricing is the 12-month moving average of industry-level median of abnormal individual 
bond IPO and SEO returns (in excess of the return on the corresponding bond index) over the 7 
days from the offering date. Equity underwriting cost is the mean gross spread per share of all 
equity IPOs in the respective industry in a given month. Debt underwriting cost is the 12-month 
moving average of the industry-level mean gross spread in a given month. Finally, we also include 
an industry liquidity index, (calculated as in Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, 2002), as the 
ratio of the value of corporate control transactions to the total book value of assets of firms in a 
given industry-year. The index proxies for the value of having equity as a liquid currency to buy 
other assets. 
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Our results in columns 1-5 are broadly consistent with the univariate results: size ((log) assets), 
age, asset tangibility (PPE/assets) and prior leverage are significantly positively related to the 
probability that a private firm chooses an IPDO over an IPO. The coefficients in Model 6, which 
contrasts the IPDO sample to the industry-year-size matched IPO sample, yield similar inferences 
to models 1-5. Controlling for firm-level and market-level determinants, sponsor-backed private 
firms are significantly more likely to issue public debt in preference to equity, consistent with the 
hypothesis that these investors value private benefits of control. The industry liquidity index is 
largely unrelated to the choice of an IPDO suggesting the creation of a liquid currency does not 
play a significant role in the choice of market. Finally, there is little evidence that misvaluation 
plays a role in the IPO market. The level of industry misvaluation and the level of equity and debt 
underpricing is unrelated to the choice of an IPDO.  
We note that our results contrast with those in Chemmanur, He, and Nandy (2010) in that they 
find that several factors (notably size and age) are significantly positively related to the decision 
to issue equity. In contrast, we find that size and age are significantly stronger determinants in the 
choice of issuing public debt in preference to equity. 
 
3.3. Comparing IPDO and PFDO firms 
Table O-1 in the online appendix compares the private IPDO firms to PFDO firms, publicly 
listed firms that are issuing debt for the first time. Both these samples comprise firms accessing 
the public debt markets for the first time in the same year and the same industry, with the major 
difference being the public status of the latter. Hence, there is likely to be a significantly greater 
amount of information available for the latter firms. While the contrast between the IPDO firms 
and the PFDO firms is less dramatic than between the IPDO and IPO firms, the general pattern is 
roughly similar. IPDO firms continue to be significantly more likely to be sponsor-backed and 
have characteristics that make their formal financial statements more informative than firms that 
choose to raise debt after going public.  
Panel A of Table O-1 shows that IPDO firms are comparable to their PFDO counterparts. Sizes 
(assets) are similar, though sales are larger. The IPDO firms are significantly older than their PFDO 
counterparts. Operating cash flow/Capex and operating ROA are both significantly better than the 
comparable PFDO firms. However, growth opportunities and leverage are similar.  
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Panel B shows that not surprisingly, the lack of public status for the IPDO firms translates into 
worse terms at the debt offering. While the size of the debt offering is similar for IPDO firms and 
PFDO firms, the offer yield and coupon are both significantly higher than the PFDO firms. The 
debt issued by the IPDO firms is more likely to be rated and to be investment grade. However, 
both Moody’s and S&P rate the debt as lower quality than the debt issued by PFDO firms. Finally, 
IPDO firms are significantly more likely to face restrictive covenants than their PFDO 
counterparts. They are more likely to offer secured debt and face borrowing restrictions, and 
restrictions on default, stock issuance, takeovers, and asset investment.  
Panel C reports coefficients from a generalized least squares (GLS) regression with year fixed 
effects, where we compare offer yields for the IPDO firms to those for the PFDO firms in the same 
industry and year. The IPDO sample exhibits a 133 to 163 basis points of incremental offer yield 
(models 1-3), and the yield differential persists after controlling for various debt, firm, and 
covenant characteristics (models 4-6). Most firm characteristics do not appear to affect the offer 
yield. In particular, sponsor-backing does not appear to affect the offer yield. IPDO firms suffer 
relative to their listed counterparts at their first debt issue. In unreported tables, we also regress 
IPDO and PFDO indicators on the yields for the universe of bonds listed on FISD, controlling for 
time fixed effects. Both IPDO and PFDO firms pay significant higher yields on their debt than the 
universe but the premium paid for IPDO bonds over the PFDO bonds persists when we compare 
both to the universe. 
 
3.4. Subsequent behavior of IPDO firms 
We next examine the subsequent capital raising behavior of the 635 firms in our original 
sample of IPDO firms. Before the end of our analysis period in 2016, only around 11% of these 
firms access the public debt market again before issuing public equity, raising an additional $132.5 
billion in public debt and $13.9 billion in public equity. A much larger number of firms, 16% of 
the IPDO sample, choose to tap the equity market subsequent to their public debt issue, without 
issuing any additional public debt prior to the IPO. The remaining IPDO firms in our sample 
choose to remain private until the end of 2016, raising an additional $552 billion of capital via the 
public debt markets. In a sequential logistic framework (untabulated), we find that while sponsor-
backed firms are significantly less likely to tap the capital markets again, the sponsor-backing 
variable loses its significance when we include macroeconomic characteristics. In particular, 
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market return and industry misvaluation variables are weakly positively related while inflation (the 
CPI level) is weakly negatively related to the choice to tap the public markets again. Firm 
characteristics are largely unimportant with the exception of operating performance (ROA). IPDO 
firms with high operating performance are significantly less likely to tap the capital markets after 
going public. 
Conditional on raising additional capital however, what determines the choice of whether to 
raise capital through equity or debt? Again, the most important determinants appear to be 
macroeconomic variables. Sponsor-backed firms are significantly less likely to tap the equity 
capital markets but their significance disappears once we once we include macroeconomic 
characteristics. The level of industry misvaluation is a strong predictor of the choice of equity for 
the subsequent capital raising decision, though this effect is to some extent mitigated for sponsor 
backed firms.  
 
3.5. Comparing subsequent debt issues of IPDO firms  
Welch (1989) argues that underpricing at the IPO acts as a signal of quality, resulting in a 
higher price at a seasoned offering. If the same mechanism holds for debt offerings, IPDO firms 
may earn better terms at a subsequent public debt or equity offering.  
The signaling mechanism does not appear to work for debt largely because debt characteristics 
change significantly between the initial and subsequent issue. Table O-2 in the Online Appendix 
shows that the average offering size is significantly larger for the subsequent issue – $250 million 
(versus $135 million for the first debt issue) and the offer yield decreases by 200 basis points in 
the second issue. We also examine variability in the use of covenants and other restrictions across 
these two samples. Most covenants appear to tighten between the first issue and the subsequent 
issue, and the univariate differences are significant at conventional significance levels. In a 
multivariate framework, when we control for these firm and covenant characteristics, there appears 
to be no difference between offer yields for the initial issue of debt by IPDO firms and their 
subsequent issues. They suggest that after the initial public issue, the additional information 
conveyed by the public status of these firms is largely irrelevant in comparison to the financial 
information disclosed in the reported financial statements of the firm.  
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3.6. Comparing subsequent equity issues of IPDO firms 
IPDO firms may benefit from lower underpricing at a subsequent equity issue, if any.7 In Table 
5, we compare the IPO characteristics of firms tapping the public capital markets for the very first 
time via an IPO, with IPO firms which have outstanding public debt (our primary IPDO sample 
carrying out a subsequent IPO). Consistent with Welch (1989), IPO underpricing, as measured by 
first day returns for IPDO firms going public is significantly lower relative to the IPO sample: 15% 
versus 51%. This suggests that on a percentage basis, the wealth transfer from issuing shareholders 
to the investing public is significantly smaller for those IPO firms who have previously tapped 
public debt markets – a surprisingly strong result – suggesting significantly less money left on the 
table for these firms. The offer price exceeds the original high filing price (“Hot” IPO indicator 
variable) in 71% and 73% of the IPDO and IPO samples, respectively. The lower proportion for 
the IPDO sample is consistent with lower information asymmetry and more stable operating 
metrics of larger and more established firms, as documented in the previous sections. Not 
surprisingly, given the reduced informational asymmetry via a more prolonged certification 
process for these firms and the lower observed underpricing, managers are more willing to raise 
additional capital – $120 million versus $60 million for the average IPDO and the IPO samples, 
respectively. 
Table 6 provides results from a multivariate regression to explain the variability in IPO 
underpricing across the two samples. Some firm and IPO characteristics appear to affect the 
underpricing in economically sensible ways. For example, age is consistently negatively related to 
the level of underpricing. In models (2)-(4), we include additional controls for underwriter effort 
(the number of managers) and find a significant negative relation between the level of underpricing 
and underwriter effort. We do not find a consistently significant relation between underpricing and 
the fees charged by the underwriters. However, the key takeaway of Table 6 is that we continue to 
find a statistically significant 17-19% lower IPO underpricing for those firms who first tap public 
debt markets prior to undertaking an IPO after controlling for various IPO and firm characteristics 
– age, size, profitability, and liquidity. 
                                                 
7 We note that Cai, Ramchand, and Warga (2004) also examine the public equity decision following the public debt 
decision. However, not all the firms that issue public debt subsequently issue equity. Our analysis so far examines the 
first going public decision without constraining the firm to have a subsequent equity issue.  
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To control for a sample selection bias resulting from the initial choice of issuing either public 
equity or public debt for the first time, we also estimate a two-stage Heckman selection model 
(results not tabulated). In the first stage, we estimate an inverse Mills ratio based on the probit 
regressions in Table 4. The prior leverage of the firm is used as the identifying restriction in the 
first stage estimation procedure.8 This restriction is based on the assumption that the prior leverage 
of the firm is likely to be a factor in the firm’s choice to issue either public equity or public debt 
for the first time (it is significant across all models in Table 4 and has been shown to be significant 
in papers examining the persistence of capital structure (see for example, Lemmon, Roberts, and 
Zender, 2008)). However, it is unlikely that this will directly affect the degree of IPO underpricing. 
In the second stage, we model IPO underpricing between two samples and control for the sample 
selection bias by including the previously estimated inverse Mills ratio. However, an insignificant 
coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio variable suggests that a potential cross-sectional selection 
bias does not influence our findings.  
Overall, our findings are supportive of the idea that, ceteris paribus, firms with public debt in 
place tend to have lower underpricing relative to their industry-year matched counterparts.  
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyze a sample of private firms that choose to go public through the debt 
markets as an alternative to the equity markets. These firms are typically significantly larger and 
less likely to have information asymmetry problems than traditional firms in the same industry and 
year. When the debt-first firms eventually go public by issuing equity, they face lower 
underpricing than firms without public debt that undertake an initial public offering in the same 
industry. Ownership structure (backing by a financial sponsor such as a venture capital or private 
equity firm) and the relative cost of information production in debt versus equity markets appear 
to be significant in explaining why these firms choose debt before equity and their subsequent 
decision to issue equity. Future research on IPOs should take into account that firms do not just 
face a simple choice between going public and staying private, but also an intermediate choice of 
issuing public debt but staying private.
                                                 
8 As an alternative instrument, we also use the need for external financing (OCF/Capital expenditure) based on 
Helwege and Liang (1996) who document that probability of obtaining external funds is unrelated to the shortfall in 
internally generated funds for a sample of firms that went public in 1983. However, our results and conclusions are 
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Appendix: Sample creation 
We obtain issuance data from Thomson-Reuters SDC Platinum (for both public debt and 
equity) and Mergent FISD (for public debt). Credit ratings that are not available in SDC and FISD 
are supplemented by data from S&P Ratings Xpress and Datastream. Fundamental firm data is 
obtained from Compustat, and price/return data are obtained from CRSP, Compustat North 
America, and Compustat Global security pricing files.  
We merge the bond and equity issuance samples from SDC and FISD with Compustat, based 
on the historical CUSIP. Compustat compiles information on non-public firms that are required to 
file periodic reports with the SEC in three specific cases. It collects information from the firm’s 
10-K reports if the number of security-holders of record is more than 300 (or 500 if the company 
does not have significant assets), if a client requests information on the firm (or S&P believes that 
the firm will be of importance to clients), or if the firm has a newsworthy event such as transaction 
activity or other key developments. In addition, Compustat back-fills data during the private period 
for firms that eventually go public by issuing debt or equity to public investors. For companies 
that do not issue public equity, if the information is not listed on Compustat for either the year of 
or prior to the issue date, we fill in missing information by hand-collecting information from the 
firm’s 10-K filings.  
We focus on the public debt issuance of corporate bonds and common stock IPOs by private 
US-based companies, but exclude issuance by financial services firms from both equity and bond 
samples. We identify the date when a company issues public debt for the first time as the earliest 
of the first public debt issuance dates in FISD and SDC. We identify the first date of public equity 
issuance as the earliest date between the IPO date in SDC and the first date with non-missing price 
data in CRSP and Compustat security pricing data (North America and Global).  
Our primary sample consists of private firms that decide to issue public debt for the first time 
at least 30 days before they issue equity for the first time. Hence, these firms do not have stock 
price histories on the date of the public debt issuance, both in CRSP and Compustat. Over the 
1987-2016 period, this IPDO sample includes 635 issuers in 43 different industries (based on the 





Likelihood of going public 
through Variables 
  Debt Equity  
Cost of information production Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999)    
  Level of disclosure 
 
Identical Identical None (same financial statements 
required) 
  Informativeness of financial statements Ball, Robin, and Sadka (2008) Higher Lower Age, level of tangible assets, 
operating performance (specific 
assets are easily collaterizable)  
  Growth opportunities Ball, Robin, and Sadka (2008) Lower Higher R&D (Difficult to value and 
write into covenants) 
Private benefits of control Boot, Gopalan and Thakor (2006, 
2008) 
Higher Lower Sponsor backing (Sponsors less 
likely to be willing to give up 
control after the firm has gone 
public) 
Corporate transaction activity Hsieh, Lyandres, and Zhdanov 
(2011), Celikyurt, Sevilir, and 
Shivdasani (2010), Helwege and 
Packer (2009) 
Lower Higher Industry liquidity index as in 
Schlingemann, Stulz, and 
Walkling (2002) (Equity is more 
useful to buy corporate assets or 
other firms) 
 
Table 1: Empirical predictions of the main theories on the market to go public 
Description: This table lists our main predictions. Established theories on the market to go public posit three main explanations for the choice of market. 
Interpretation: Firms should prefer to go public in debt markets when they are older, have high levels of tangible assets and operating performance, have fewer 





Unlisted firms issuing 
public debt for the first time 
(IPDO) 
 
Unlisted firms issuing 
public equity for the first 
time (IPO) 
(matched on industry)  
Unlisted firms issuing public 
equity for the first time (IPO) 
(matched on industry and size) 
 
Listed firms issuing public debt 
for the first time (PFDO) 






















1987 34 4,317  213 6,508  6 432  49 2,354 
1988 36 7,376  68 1,822  5 25  13 916 
1989 26 4,249  42 1,661  3 1,146  9 941 
1990 4 440  21 762  2 24  2 275 
1991 6 360  32 1,618  0 0  4 330 
1992 25 2,755  189 6,230  15 941  29 3,159 
1993 36 5,761  248 9,046  34 2,299  56 4,190 
1994 32 3,119  192 5,514  20 2,695  33 3,884 
1995 19 1,796  114 6,399  12 3,836  37 3,719 
1996 40 5,719  358 15,682  54 4,654  51 5,232 
1997 84 12,572  307 13,097  91 8,132  100 7,889 
1998 87 11,504  198 15,694  63 5,155  135 20,845 
1999 35 5,821  338 27,933  164 17,620  66 11,599 
2000 18 2,507  190 19,401  47 8,425  49 10,961 
2001 13 1,770  3 1,410  6 522  11 5,588 
2002 9 2,197  20 2,130  13 2,146  20 2,889 
2003 15 3,312  11 2,630  4 959  14 3,519 
2004 17 3,125  39 6,611  20 3,528  36 5,667 
2005 7 1,835  18 2,614  8 1,573  16 1,931 
2006 6 3,151  28 2,461  3 1,050  6 1,679 
2007 2 350  5 852  3 1,258  11 2,181 
2010 10 111  47 4,998  42 5,329  8 1,037 
2011 17 381  44 5,960  33 5,718  13 3,102 
2012 12 1,980  37 6,416  28 5,763  25 6,348 
 
 
2013 8 406  54 6,706  46 6,640  23 6,044 
2014 14 83  95 12,025  87 11,725  33 7,315 
2015 14 737  39 6,555  39 6,555  35 5,505 
2016 9 7  13 1,268  2 399  13 2,885 
Total 635 87,741  2,963 194,003  850 108,549  897 131,984 
 
Table 2. First public debt vs. first public equity issuance: Number and size of issues, 1987-2016 
Description: The primary sample of initial public debt offering (IPDO) firms includes private unlisted firms (with no traded equity in CRSP and Compustat) 
that issue public debt for the first time. The total amount of debt raised is obtained from Mergent FISD and SDC. The SDC IPO equity issues include records 
with ipoflag=’Yes’ and security type of common/ordinary shares. The first IPO sample is a control sample of unlisted firms without public debt outstanding 
issuing public equity for the first time in the same year and industry. The second IPO sample is a control sample of unlisted firms without public debt outstanding 
issuing public equity for the first time in the same year, industry, and size quintile. IPO firms in this sample are constrained to have assets at least as large as 
the assets of the matching IPDO firm in that industry and year. They are not constrained to be listed on Compustat (they may not necessarily have GVKey 
information). The PFDO sample is a control sample of publicly listed firms that issue public debt for the first time in the same year and industry. Public debt 
issues include corporate bonds (bond types CDEB, CMTN, CMTZ, CCOV, CP, USBN, CS, CCPI, CPAS) from Mergent FISD and SDC. No firms issued initial 
public debt offerings in 2008 and 2009. Financial services firms are excluded (SIC in 6000-6999). 
 
Interpretation: This table shows that our sample of IPDO firms is a non-trivial proportion (around 21%) of all IPO firms that issue equity in the same industry 
































 (1)  (2)  (1)-(2)   (3) (1)-(3)  
A. Ownership           
Sponsor-backed 0.70  0.48  0.22 0.00  0.55 0.15 0.00 




     
Age (in years) 10  5  5 0.00  5 5 0.00 
Total assets 382.4  91.4  291 0.00  162.8 219.6 0.00 







     
Operating Cash Flow/Capex 0.77  −0.01  0.78 0.00  0.02 0.75 0.00 
ROA 0.00  −0.11  0.11 0.00  −0.05 0.05 0.00 
Operating ROA 0.01  −0.09  0.1 0.00  −0.04 0.05 0.00 






     
R&D/Assets 0.01 0.04 −0.03 0.00  0.02 −0.01 0.00 
















0.73 0.21  0.16 0.82 0.18 




0.46 0.03  0.11 0.43 0.04 




1.11 0.74  -2.14 2.55 0.41 











     
Current Ratio 0.54  1.93  −1.39 0.00  1.55 −1.01 0.00 
Quick Ratio 0.54  1.91  −1.37 0.00  1.53 −0.99 0.00 
Cash ratio 0.55  1.98  −1.43 0.00  1.59 −1.04 0.00 
 
Table 3. IPDO vs. IPO firms: Comparison of industry-median-adjusted firm characteristics 
Description: This table presents industry-median-adjusted average values (except for ownership (unadjusted average values) and age, assets, and sales (unadjusted 
median values)) for the IPDO and IPO samples described in Table 2. P-values from a Wilcoxon test to test the differences in medians across the two samples are 
also reported. Sponsor-backed is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if SDC lists the firm as having had a financial sponsor prior to the IPDO date. Age is from 
 
 
the Capital IQ Company table (item Year Founded). Assets and sales are AT and SALE from the Compustat Fundamentals (annual) dataset. ROA is the sum of net 
income after extraordinary items (NI) and interest expense (XINT), scaled by (lagged) assets. Operating ROA is operating income after depreciation (OIADP) scaled 
by (lagged) assets. R&D ratios are based on XRD, and PPE/Assets is property, plant and equipment (PPENT) as % of assets. Debt/EBITDA and Debt/Book equity 
are based on long–term debt (DLTT); book equity is computed as in Daniel and Titman (2006). Interest coverage is the interest expense (XINT) net of interest 
income (IDIT) divided by operating cash flow. Net working capital is the difference between current assets (ACT) and current liabilities (LCT). The current ratio is 
the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, the quick ratio is current assets net of inventories (INVT) scaled by current liabilities, and the cash ratio is cash and 
short-term investments (CHE) divided by current liabilities (LCT).  
 
Interpretation: This table shows that our sample of IPDO firms is older, larger, more profitable, have fewer growth opportunities, are more likely to be sponsor-
backed (have a private equity or venture capital sponsor), are more indebted and have less liquid assets than an equivalent sample of IPO firms issuing in the same 




 Matched on year and industry 
 Matched on 
year, size, 
and industry 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) 
Ownership 
      
 
Sponsor backed 0.90 0.86 0.87 0.61 0.58 
 
0.53  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
B. Age and size 
       
Log (assets) 
 
0.43 0.42 0.43 0.37 
 
0.25   





0.23 0.23 0.18 0.18 
 
0.19   




       
ROA 
  
0.26 1.68 0.65 
 
0.26    
(0.24) (0.00) (0.10) 
 
(0.56) 
OCF/Capex    0.00 0.02  0.01 
    (0.93) (0.03)  (0.34) 
(OCF/Capex) × Sponsor backed    0.00 −0.03  −0.01 
    (0.96) (0.03)  (0.33) 
D. Liquidity 
       
Current Ratio 
   
−0.02 0.00 
 





       
Debt/Assets 
   
0.81 1.88 
 




F. Growth opportunities 
       
Asset tangibility (PPE/Assets) 
    
0.58 
 














G. Windows of opportunity        
Industry misvaluation     0.00  −0.03 
     (0.85)  (0.63) 
Equity underpricing 



















Equity underwriting costs 









Debt underwriting costs 









H. Transaction liquidity        
Industry liquidity Index 









Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes 
R2 0.22 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.46 
 
0.46 




Table 4. Probit model of the choice to go public through debt over equity
 
 
Description: This table reports coefficients from a probit model where the dependent variable is 1 for an 
IPDO firm and 0 for an IPO firm. Industry misvaluation is computed as in Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and 
Vishwanathan (2005). Specifically, we compute the industry median (in a given month) of the difference 
between (log) market equity and book equity in that month for all firms in that industry. Industry 
misvaluation is the deviation of this median from its long-run mean over the previous 12 months. Equity 
underpricing is the median first day return of all equity IPOs in the respective Fama-French industry in a 
given month, while debt underpricing is the 12-month moving average of industry-level median of 
abnormal individual bond IPO and SEO returns (in excess of the return on the corresponding bond index) 
over the 7 days from the offering date. Equity underwriting cost is the mean gross spread per share of all 
equity IPOs in the respective industry in a given month. Debt underwriting cost is the 12-month moving 
average of the industry-level mean gross spread in a given month. Industry liquidity index is a ratio of the 
value of corporate control transactions to the total book value of assets of firms in a given industry-year. 
All other variables are defined in Table 3. All firm characteristics are industry-adjusted. Standard errors are 
clustered by year. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
Interpretation: This table shows that in a multivariate framework, largely the same results hold as in the 
univariate framework. IPDO firms are more likely to be sponsor-backed, larger, older, have more tangible 









without public debt 
in place going public 





 First day return (mean) 0.15 0.51 −0.36 0.00 
 “Hot” IPO indicator variable 0.71 0.73 −0.02 0.00 
 Sponsor-backed 0.18 0.58 −0.40 0.01 
 Principal amount raised ($ mil.) 120.00 60.00 60.00 0.00 
 Quote spread (%, mean) 
 
Underwriter effort 
1.02 0.99 0.03 0.42 
 Syndicated Indicator variable (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) 1.00 0.98 0.02 0.01 
 Number of Managers 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Underwriter fees 
    
 Gross Spread as % of Principal Amount  6.75 7.00 −0.25 0.00 
 Management fee as % of Principal Amount  1.41 1.61 −0.20 0.00 
 Underwriting fee as % of Principal Amount  1.43 1.61 −0.18 0.00 
 
Table 5. Unlisted firms with and without public debt outstanding: Comparison of terms of subsequent IPO 
 
Description: This table reports the average first day IPO return and binary indicator variables (means) and other 
IPO characteristics (medians) for firms with existing public debt that went public in our sample and industry-
year matched unlisted firms that went public without any public debt outstanding. IPO characteristics are 
obtained from the SDC equity issuance database. The first day return is the difference between the closing price 
on the first day of trading and the offer price scaled by the offer price. “Hot” IPO indicator variable equals 1 if 
the offer price exceeds the original high filing price in the prospectus and 0 otherwise. The syndicated indicator 
variable takes the value 1 if the IPO is syndicated and 0 otherwise. Quote spread is the defined as the bid-ask 
spread scaled by the bid-ask midpoint (it is set to missing if it is greater than ½ of bid-ask midpoint). The average 
quote spread is computed over 60 days following the IPO. The rest of the variables are self-explanatory. The 
last column reports p-values for the t-test (for means) and Wilcoxon non-parametric test (for medians). 
 
Interpretation: This table shows that our sample of IPDO firms have significantly lower underpricing and 
underwriting fees if they go public than an equivalent sample of IPO firms issuing in the same industry and year. 
Firms who have gone public through debt have reduced their levels of information asymmetry and this shows 
up in the level of underpricing they receive and in the fees they are charged when they issue public equity. 




Variable (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
IPDO firm indicator variable −0.17 −0.18 −0.19  −0.18 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
 (0.09) 
Controls 
     
Sponsor-backed IPO 0.20 0.21 0.21  0.05 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 (0.63) 
Log Assets 0.01 0.03 0.01  0.00 
 (0.64) (0.18) (0.83) 
 (0.93) 
Log Age −0.10 −0.11 −0.10  −0.02 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 (0.44) 
ROA −0.14 −0.17 −0.16  −1.06 
 (0.22) (0.15) (0.19) 
 (0.01) 
OCF/Capex 0.05 0.06 0.12  −0.31 
 (0.58) (0.49) (0.16) 
 (0.50) 
PPE/Assets −0.32 −0.32 −0.28  −0.26 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.21) 
 (0.34) 
Current Ratio (×100) 0.02 0.01 0.01  0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 (0.08) 
Log IPO Amount Raised 0.06 0.07 0.12  0.09 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.01) 
 (0.19) 
Syndicated Indicator variable  0.24 0.21  0.41 
  (0.00) (0.01) 
 (0.00) 
Number of managers  −0.03 −0.03  −0.04 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
 (0.03) 
Gross Spread as % of amount raised   0.38  0.00 
   (0.01)  (0.99) 
      
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.12 0.13  0.15 
N 455 455 455   207 
 
 
Table 6. Relative underpricing of IPDO firms vs. IPO firms at subsequent IPO 
 
Description: This table reports coefficients from OLS regressions of the IPO first-day return (IPO 
underpricing proxy) for the IPDO firms that issue public equity during the sample period and firms going 
public without public debt in place in the same industry and year. IPO characteristics are obtained from the 
SDC equity issuance database. The IPO of the IPDO firm indicator variable equals 1 if an IPO is by an 
IPDO firm with existing public debt and 0 if it is an IPO by the firm without public debt outstanding, issuing 
public equity in the same industry and year. Firm characteristics are industry-adjusted and defined as in 
Table 3. The syndicated indicator variable is 1 if an IPO is syndicated and 0 otherwise. Other deal variables 
are self-explanatory. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
  
Interpretation: This table shows that the IPDO indicator variable continues to be negative and significant 
in a multivariate framework after controlling for other control variables. As in the previous table, this 
suggests that going public initially through debt reduces information asymmetry and underpricing when the 
firms issue public equity later.  








Figure 1. Patterns of issuance 
 
Description: (Panel A) Number of firms issuing equity or debt. This panel plots the number of IPDO firms, industry-
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IPDO firms IPO firms (Matched on industry)
IPO firms (Matched on industry and size) PFDO firms
 IPO samples matched on industry, and matched on industry and size, are both positive and significant at 0.71 and 0.47 
respectively. The correlation between the IPDO sample and PFDO sample is higher at 0.89. (Panel B) This panel plots 
the dollar amount issued by IPDO firms, industry-matched and industry-size matched IPOs and PFDO firms by year. 
The correlations between the IPDO sample and the IPO samples matched on industry, and matched on industry and size, 
are both positive and significant at 0.46 and 0.17 respectively. The correlation between the IPDO sample and PFDO 
sample is higher at 0.53.  
 
Interpretation: Though there appears to be a significant time-series component to when firms tap the capital markets, 
through debt or equity, there appear to be few differences in the choice of market to do so. 
